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Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension freezes in large healthy ﬁrms such as Verizon and
IBM, as well as terminations of plans in the struggling steel and airline industries,
highlight the fact that these traditional pensions cannot be viewed as risk-free promises
from the employee’s perspective. Indeed, the current turmoil in ﬁnancial markets and
diﬃcult economic outlook for many ﬁrms suggest that many more pension plans could be
frozen soon. In this preliminary paper we develop an empirical dynamic programming
framework to investigate household saving decisions in a model economy with freeze-
prone DB pensions. The model incorporates important sources of uncertainty facing
households, including asset returns, employment, income, and mortality, as well as
pension freezes. Applying a compensating variation measure of welfare, we ﬁnd that
pension freezes reduce welfare by a maximum of about $6,000 for individuals with a
high school degree and about $2,000 for individuals with a college degree. We close
by highlighting a few important issues that are missing from our preliminary analysis,
including a labor supply decision and the eﬀects of market-clearing conditions in the
labor market. We hope to address these issues in future work.
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11 Introduction
The ongoing transition from traditional deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans to deﬁned contribution
(DC) plans implies, among other things, a change in saving incentives and risk exposure
for U.S. households. The popular media has generally seen this transition as one from a
risk-free pension world to one subject to choice and uncertainty, but this obscures the fact
that DB beneﬁts are themselves prone to considerable uncertainty because of job changes,
wage ﬂuctuations, and recently, the rising incidence of pension freezes and terminations.
Freezes in large healthy ﬁrms such as Verizon and IBM, as well as terminations of plans in
the struggling steel and airline industries, highlight the fact that these traditional pensions
cannot be viewed as risk-free promises from the employee’s perspective. Indeed, the current
turmoil in ﬁnancial markets and diﬃcult economic outlook for many ﬁrms suggest that
many more pension plans could be frozen soon. In this preliminary paper we develop a
stochastic dynamic programming model to understand how the rising risks associated with
DB freezes and terminations might aﬀect household saving decisions and expected lifetime
utility.
1.1 The Shift from DB to DC
Traditional DB plans provide retirees with a lifetime annuity in retirement. The amount
of the annuity is typically a function of the number of years of service and average or ﬁnal
pay. For example, a typical formula might provide a retiree with an annuity equal to 1.5
percent of ﬁnal pay for each year of service.1 Since both pay and years of service increase
over time, the typical formula produces a steeply increasing accrual pattern in which the
bulk of the ﬁnal beneﬁt is accrued in the years just before retirement. For example, a
worker with 5 years of service and “ﬁnal pay” (e.g., average of the highest three years)
of $25,000 would have accrued an annuity of 5×$25,000×.015=$1,875 in our model plan,
while a worker with 30 years of service and ﬁnal pay of $100,000 would receive an annuity
of 30×$100,000×.015=$45,000. That is, while the latter worker’s pay is four times higher
than the former’s, her annuity is 24 times larger, due to the interaction of higher pay and
more years of service.
1.1.1 Decreasing Demand from Workers
This “back-loaded” beneﬁt accrual pattern has the eﬀect of rewarding workers with long
tenure, and it successfully provides a stable source of retirement income for long-tenure
workers. However, as shown by our example, workers with shorter tenures earn considerably
1In practice, most “ﬁnal pay” plans use an average of the highest 3 or 5 years of pay. In addition, most
plans cap years of service at, e.g., 30 or 35 years.
1less from the traditional formula. Traditional DB beneﬁts are not “portable,” in the sense
that a worker who moves to a new job must start over in a new DB plan, resetting years
of service to zero at each job change. As a result, a worker who changes jobs several times
in her career will not acquire the long tenure necessary to accrue a signiﬁcant beneﬁt. As
the labor market has become more mobile and job changes more frequent, the value of
traditional DB coverage has fallen. In contrast, DC plans, which accrue savings in a tax-
preferred account, are more portable across employers and provide a more linear accrual
pattern, which make them relatively more valuable as job mobility increases. DC plans
became increasingly popular after the introduction of section 401(k) of the tax code, which
provides for a deferral of income tax on wages allocated to a DC account rather than taken
as cash. These plans became particulaly popular because most employers match workers’
401(k) contributions. During the late 1990s the stock market soared and many employees
(particularly younger workers) viewed 401(k) plans as an especially eﬀective and convenient
way to prepare for retirement.
1.1.2 Increasing Costs for Firms
At the same time that increasing job mobility and the advent of 401(k) plans were reducing
workers’ demand for traditional DB pensions, other forces were reducing employers’ willing-
ness to provide them.2 In 1985 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released
guidance requiring the use of a certain type of actuarial method in accounting for the ac-
crual of pension beneﬁts. The required method, called the projected unit credit method,
accounted for pension costs as they accrued, rather than spreading them evenly over each
worker’s expected career. Since DB beneﬁts accrue rapidly at the end of a career, the switch
to the new method reduced funding costs for younger workers and increased them for older
workers. FASB’s guidance really only applied to the accounting treatment of pension plans
as reported on annual statements; ﬁrms were still free to use diﬀerent assumptions in calcu-
lating their required contributions. Nonetheless, many plans made conforming changes to
their assumptions on the funding side. This was signiﬁcant, because it meant that as baby
boomers aged, pension funding costs rose quickly. As global competition increased, these
higher costs became a signiﬁcant drag on ﬁrms’ competitiveness.
In addition to the accounting changes, tax laws also changed in the 1980s. Because
employer contributions to DB funds and earnings thereon were tax-exempt, Congress added
a “full-funding limit” in 1987 to limit revenue losses, a change that reduced companies’
incentive to contribute to the plans. After a series of high-proﬁle corporate takeovers in
which acquirers terminated over-funded plans in order to gain access to the excess assets,
2This discussion closely follows Munnell and Soto (2007). See that paper for a more detailed exposition
of the institutional history of DB plans.
2Congress also added a “reversion tax” of (eventually) 50 percent (in addition to ordinary
corporate income tax) on excess assets reclaimed from terminated plans. Moreover, to limit
the tax expenditure on high-income pension participants, Congress capped the amount of
compensation that could be considered in funding pension beneﬁts. While the cap itself was
indexed for inﬂation, ﬁrms were not permitted to take this indexation into account when
funding future beneﬁts. All of these changes had the eﬀect of reducing ﬁrms’ incentive to
fund pension beneﬁts.
1.1.3 Recent Developments
When the stock market bubble burst in 2000, pension funds were hit with what came
to be called “the perfect storm”: stock losses reduced funds’ assets signiﬁcantly, while
lower interest rates increased the present value of future pension payments. As a result,
the funding status of many pension plans (i.e., assets relative to liabilities) deteriorated
dramatically. The resulting funding gaps put unprecedented pressure on the Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the insurer of private pension plans. A number of large
underfunded plans terminated in bankruptcy, resulting in record claims on the PBGC.
While from 1995 to 2000 net claims on the PBGC averaged $133 million per year, from
2001 to 2005 the average was over $4 billion per year. From 2000 to 2004 the net position
of the PBGC (assets less liabilities) plummeted from $10 billion to -$23 billion.
Partly in response to the funding crisis, Congress passed the Pension Protection Act
of 2006, a major reform of pension rules that tightened funding requirements and moved
the pension regulatory system away from actuarial or smoothed values and toward mar-
ket values. About the same time, FASB announced new guidance requiring for the ﬁrst
time that ﬁrms recognize the net position of the pension funds on their balance sheets.3
FASB also began a longer-term project to reform the accounting of pension accruals on
corporate earnings statements. This new guidance is widely expected to reduce the use of
the smoothed values and require recognition of changes in the market value of the pension
fund on earnings statements—potentially making earnings statements much more volatile.
The combined eﬀect of these recent developments, on top of the longer-term trends already
at work, has been a signiﬁcant acceleration of the retreat from DB plans among private
sponsors.
The current ﬁnancial crisis, and diﬃcult economic outlook for many ﬁrms, seem likely
to accelerate pension freezes. So far this year, the eﬀect of steep stock losses on funding
status has been somewhat oﬀset by sharply higher corporate interest rates (which lead
to lower calculations of pension liabilties). This oﬀset is arguably a mirage, because the
higher corporate rates do not really change the underlying economics of the pension plan’s
3Previously, the assets and liabilities of the pension fund were separately disclosed in footnotes.
3ﬁnances, while the lower stock prices do.4 Nonetheless, the higher rates have real eﬀects
because future required contributions are calculated relative to the funding measure based
on corporate rates. Regardless of the partial oﬀset, however, it is likely that many DB plans
will face signiﬁcantly weakened funding positions next year, at a time when sponsoring ﬁrms
are expecting diﬃcult economic conditions of their own. In this environment, an acceleration
of pension freezes seems likely.5
1.2 Freezes and Terminations
Firms are legally required to pay pension promises already accrued; however, they are free
to modify, freeze or terminate their plans going forward. A modiﬁcation could include,
for example, a reduction in the accrual rate (e.g., from 1.5% per year to 1% per year), a
reduction in the maximum years of service considered, etc. A freeze can take several forms,
but generally involves a cessation of new accruals. A “hard freeze” eliminates all future
accruals, so annuities will not grow from the level reached at the time of the freeze. A “soft
freeze” typically eliminates new accruals based on years of service, but allows annuities to
continue to rise based on rising earnings. A “partial freeze” freezes beneﬁts for some workers
but not others. A “closed plan” does not accept any new entrants but allows accruals
for current participants. Terminations generally take one of two forms, but both involve
ending the program and surrendering the pension fund. In a standard termination, the ﬁrm
liquidates the fund and uses the assets to buy annuities from an insurance company in order
to provide the promised beneﬁts to each worker. Standard terminations generally require
the pension to be fully funded. In a “distress termination,” the ﬁrm turns the pension assets
and liabilities over to the PBGC. Distress terminations are used by underfunded plans in
bankrupt ﬁrms, and generally require the approval of the bankruptcy judge.
As noted above, the dollar value of distress terminations has skyrocketed since 2000,
causing a severe strain on the PBGC. But freezes have also increased dramatically. A partial
list of well-known ﬁrms announcing hard freezes in the past few years includes Coca Cola,
Delphi, FedEx, Fidelity, Goodyear, IBM, Michelin, NASDAQ, State St Corp., Suntrust
Banks, and Verizon. Soft freezes have been less common, but include Dupont, GM, and
Hershey. As shown in the table below, a PBGC analysis of hard freezes found that by 2005,
14 percent of DB plans had instituted hard freezes, covering 6 percent of DB participants.
Note that this table understates freezes to the extent that it does not include soft freezes,
partial freezes or closed plans. Moreover, many other ﬁrms are considering a freeze: a recent
Towers Perrin survey of senior ﬁnance executives found that 48 percent of companies would
4That is, the “true” economic liabilities of the pension plan are more correctly measured by a risk-free
rate.
5In addition to its previously announced DB pension freeze, last week GM announced it was temporarily
suspending matching contributions in its 401(k) plans for salaried workers.
4freeze deﬁned beneﬁt plans if those plans cut into buybacks, capital spending, or other
priorities. In 2006, fully 62 percent of companies were considering freezing pension plans in
the face of the changing legislative and accounting environment discussed above.
Virtually all ﬁrms announcing a freeze simultaneously announced enhancements to DC
beneﬁts, typically in the form of more generous matching provisions. Thus, depending on
a worker’s age and the size of the enhancement relative to the DB generosity, some workers
may be fully compensated or even better oﬀ after the freeze (typically younger workers),
while others may be less than fully compensated (typically workers closer to retirement).
This age proﬁle in compensation changes is something that we will explore in more detail
in our model of pension freezes and terminations.
2 Previous Literature
Because the trend toward pension freezes is so recent, the literature studying them has only
recently begun. As mentioned above, the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (2008)
analyzes hard freezes from 2003 to 2005, ﬁnding that about 14 percent of plans are hard-
frozen. They also ﬁnd that small plans are more likely to freeze than large plans and that
frozen plans were only about half as likely as non-frozen plans to be fully funded. By
industry, manufacturing shows the highest freeze rate (about 18 percent by 2005), while
ﬁnancial ﬁrms showed the lowest (about 9 percent). The Government Accountability Oﬃce
(2008) performed a new survey of DB plans, ﬁnding signiﬁcant incidence of freezing since
2005. They ﬁnd that fully 21 percent of all active (i.e., non-retired) participants are now
aﬀected by a freeze, and that half of sponsoring ﬁrms have at least one frozen plan. About
44 percent of the frozen plans are hard frozen. They ﬁnd that the hard-freeze rate is
signiﬁcantly higher among small ﬁrms, and the freeze rate is signiﬁcantly lower among
collectively bargained plans.
The Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute (2006) uses a simulation model to analyze how
freezes aﬀect workers of diﬀerent ages and salary levels. They calculate the level of annual
employer contribution rate to a DC plan that would fully compensate each worker in their
database. They estimate a median rate of 8 percent, assuming 8 percent returns on future
DC assets. But they ﬁnd a large degree of heterogeneity—even a contribution rate of 16
percent would leave a quarter of workers (mostly older) less than fully compensated.
Munnell and Soto (2007) provide a detailed historical context for the current wave
of pension freezes, and then assemble a database of pension plans by merging data from
Department of Labor Form 5500 reports (ﬁled annually by private pension plans) with ﬁrm-
level data from Compustat. They ﬁnd that about 15 percent of plans are frozen, and that
the likelihood of a freeze is higher among ﬁrms with lower funding levels, lower credit ratings,
5and more retired participants relative to total participants (and thus higher pension costs).
Beaudoin et al. (2007) use a sample of S&P500 ﬁrms from Compustat to study the correlates
of a pension freeze among a large number of ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial statistics, ﬁnding that the
best predictor seems to be the funding status of the plan. Finally, Rubin (2007) studies the
impact of pension freezes on ﬁrm value, and the market response to freeze announcements.
He ﬁnds that freezes do increase ﬁrm value but that markets lag in responding to the
increase.
These papers have provided the ﬁrst analysis of pension freezes and their eﬀect on
workers. Our contribution is to examine the eﬀects of pension freezes in the context of a
life-cycle model of saving. As described in the following sections, our approach is to develop
a stochastic dynamic programming model to understand how the risks associated with DB
freezes and terminations aﬀect household saving and expected lifetime utility.
3 The Model
Our model economy builds on the work of Schrager (2006) to allow for pension freezes and
terminations.6 The key innovation in our framework is that we allow for the possibility that
ﬁrms shut down their deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension and replace it with a deﬁned contribution
(DC) plan. Since not all ﬁrms oﬀer pensions and there is always the possibility of a job
separation, we also consider job changes from ﬁrms with pensions to those without.
Our model individuals start working at age 20, retire at age 65, and live to a maximum
of age 100. During the working years, they occupy one of three employment states. They
can be employed by a ﬁrm oﬀering a traditional DB pension; they can be employed by a
ﬁrm oﬀering a DC pension; or they can be employed at a ﬁrm without a pension. Under
both types of pension plans, beneﬁts vest immediately.7
The DC pension plan is characterized by an employer match rate µ, a limit on employer
matching contributions, ψ, and a statutory limit on annual employee contributions, L.8
Ordinarily, modeling DC plans requires one to keep track of an additional continuous state
6Schrager (2006) investigates the impact of increased job turnover on the attractiveness (to employees)
of DB pensions relative to DC plans. To compare the expected utility beneﬁts associated with each pension
type, Schrager models two steady-state economies: one in which individuals have access only to DB plans
and another in which individuals have access only to DC plans. Because we are interested in the eﬀects of
freezes and terminations, we need to consider an economy in which both types of plans are oﬀered. Thus
one of the key distinctions in our modeling approach is to allow for transitions between ﬁrms oﬀering DB
and DC pensions.
7In practice, diﬀerent vesting rules apply for 401(k) plans and DB pensions. Modeling vesting durations
greatly complicates the numerical solution to the problem since it requires keeping track of both vested and
unvested beneﬁts in DB and DC plans.
8The modal 401(k) employer matching arrangement is a 50% match up to 6% of employee salary (Costo,
2006). The legal limit on employee contributions in 2008 is $15,500 (with an additional $5,000 of catch-up
contributions for employees aged 50 and older).
6variable for accumulated savings in the retirement account.9 The additional state variable
is particularly expensive in our modeling framework since we allow individuals to have
accumulated beneﬁts in both DB and DC pension plans. We can reduce the dimension
of the computational problem from three continuous state variables (conventional saving,
DC savings, and DB beneﬁts) to two by calculating the annuity value of DC accruals and
adding them to accrued DB beneﬁts. We avoid the need to carry permanent income as a
separate state variable by normalizing the other state variables to permanent income.
We convert DC balances into an actuarially fair annuity using a price that depends on
the beneﬁciary’s age and gender. We use a pre-tax interest rate because DC contributions
accrue tax-free under current law.10 Thus we deﬁne the annuity value of a DC contribution
as φtYt+µmin[φt,ψ]Yt)/Qt, where the ﬁrst term represents the employee’s contribution rate
times income, and the second term represents the employer’s match rate times the lesser of
the employee’s contribution and the matching limit. We divide by the annuity price Qt in
order to convert the total DC contributions into an annuity that starts payments at age 65.
We model the DB accrual using a standard formula linking beneﬁts to years of service
at the ﬁrm dt, ﬁnal permanent income Pt,11 and a beneﬁt accrual rate α. We deﬁne the real
value of the DB annuity as αdtPt/(1 + π)65−t, where π is the economy-wide inﬂation rate.
Most private DB plans are not adjusted for inﬂation, making the declining real value of
pension accruals before retirement an important cost of pension freezes and terminations.
Nonetheless, for computational simplicitly, we model DB payments in retirement as real
annuities (i.e., ﬁxed in real terms).12
Individuals in our model select a level of consumption Ct and (if they are employed
at a ﬁrm oﬀering a DC pension) a contribution rate φt, to maximize expected discounted
lifetime utility. The value function describing the individual’s problem is given by:
V (Xt,Pt,At) = max
Ct,φt
{u(Ct) + StβEtV (Xt+1,Pt+1,At+1) + (1 − St)B(Xt)}, (1)
such that
Xt = Rτ(Xt−1 − Ct−1) + (1 − τy)(1 − φt)Yt, (2)
9See, e.g., Engen et al. (1994), Laibson et al. (1998), and Love (2006).
10Note that the pre-tax interest rate is higher than the after-tax rate, and thus leads to a lower annuity
price. See Brown and Poterba (2000) for the present value formula for the price of an actuarially fair annuity.
11We make the DB formula depend on ﬁnal permanent income, rather just income, because DB formulas
generally take an average of either the last few years of salary or the highest few years of salary. If we made
the DB formula depend on ﬁnal income, Yt, we would overstate the riskiness of DB beneﬁts attributable to
transitory ﬂuctuations in earnings (i.e., Θt shocks).
12Given the infrequency of COLAs in private pension plans, it would be more accurate to model a nominal
pension beneﬁt stream in retirement as well. Assuming a real stream of retirement income, however, greatly
simpliﬁes the solution of the model since we do not need to keep track of separate variables for DB beneﬁts,
DC beneﬁts, and Social Security; since all pay a real stream of income in our model, all can be modeled as






At−1 if employee does not have a pension
At−1 + (φtYt + µmin[φt,ψ]Yt)/Qt if employee has a DC pension
At−1 + (1 + π)t−65α[dtPt − dt−1Pt−1/(1 + π)] if employee has a DB pension,
(3)
where Pt is permanent income, Rτ = 1 + (1 − τr)rt is the after-tax interest rate, St is
the conditional survival probability, u(.) is an iso-elastic period utility function, B(.) is
an iso-elastic bequest function, and τr and τy are the tax rates on returns and income,
respectively. We assume that individuals can obtain annuities only through their employer-
provided pension plans.13 Because DC contributions are tax-deferred, a contribution of φt
generates an after-tax income of (1 − φt)(1 − τy)Yt.14
Following Carroll (1992), we decompose the error process of income into a permanent
component Nt and a transitory component Θt. Income in period t is equal to permanent
income multiplied by the transitory shock:
Yt+1 = Pt+1Θt+1 (4)
Pt+1 = Gt+1PtNt+1, (5)
where G is the trend growth rate of permanent income, and N and Θ are lognormally












. The unit root process
on income allows us to normalize by the level of permanent income, greatly simplifying the
computational problem.
3.1 Solving for consumption
Using lower-case variables to denote the normalization by permanent income (e.g., xt =
Xt/Pt), we can write the ﬁrst order condition for consumption as:
u0(ct) = βRτ 
StEtu0(Γt+1ct+1(Rτat/Γt+1 + (1 − τy)(1 − φ∗




where wt = xt − ct is end-of-period saving, ct+1(.) is the decision rule for consumption
in period t + 1, φ∗
t+1 is the optimal choice of DC contributions, Γt = NtGt is the growth
rate of permanent income, and expectations are taken over the employment states (DC,
DB, or none) and transitory and permanent income. We follow Carroll (2007) and apply
the method of endogenous grid points to solve for the optimal consumption decision rules.
13In reality, private annuity markets are thin, with very low rates of participation (Benitez-Silva, 2003).
Because ﬁrms can take advantage of group annuity pricing, it is reasonable to assume that actuarially fair
annuities are only available through ﬁrms and Social Security.
14That is, the interaction term φτ is not subtracted from income.
8Given a list of at points, we can solve the ﬁrst order condition in equation (6) to ﬁnd a
decision rule for consumption in terms of end-of-period saving, at, which we can use, in
turn, to recover the endogenous level of cash-on-hand through the identity xt = wt + ct.
3.2 Solving for DC contributions
The ﬁrst order condition for consumption assumes that we know the optimal value of DC
contributions, φ∗
t+1. One drawback of the cash-on-hand formulation of the problem is that
there is no distinction between savings and income, since both are rolled together in the
deﬁnition of cash on hand. Since DC contributions are expressed as a fraction of current
income, the inability to separate income and savings means that we have to adopt an
alternative approach to solving for optimal contributions (as opposed to the usual ﬁrst-
order condition for saving). Our method asks, for a given level of end-of-period savings wt,
what the optimal contribution would be for each independent realization of the transitory
and permanent shocks. Suppose that we have an interpolated value function ˆ v(xt,at), where
at is the normalized level of the pension annuity. For each combination of discrete end-of-
period savings wi, annuity aj, transitory shock Θk, and permanent shock Nl, we can solve
















where Q is the price of an actuarially fair annuity. The ﬁrst term inside the interpolated
value function is the remaining cash on hand after contributing φ × 100 percent of income
to the DC account. The second term is the resulting size of the retirement annuity: the
incoming value plus the annuity value of the employee and employer contributions to the
DC plan.
In each period t, we solve for the decision rules for contributions φ, which tell us the
optimal level of contributions for any discrete combination of wt, at, Θt+1, and Nt+1. Sub-
stituting these values of φ∗ into the expected decision rule in equation (6), we can then
solve for the optimal level of period-t consumption. Thus for a given set of discrete values
for wt, at, and dt (job tenure), we can solve for the optimal policy rules for ct and φt for
each of our three employment states.
4 Calibration and parameterization
We use our modeling framework to approximate the welfare consequences of DB freezes
and terminations. In order to take the quantitative predictions seriously, it is important to
calibrate the model’s parameters to match, at least approximately, empirical evidence on
9income, assets, and job separations.
4.1 Income Process
As is common in the life-cycle consumption literature, we estimate the income process
during the working years using panel data from the PSID (the 1980–2003 waves). We take
a broad deﬁnition of household non-asset income that sums labor income, public transfers
(including Social Security retirement beneﬁts, SSI, food stamps, unemployment beneﬁts,
and welfare beneﬁts), and private transfers (e.g., child support and income receipts from
non-household members), net of federal and state income taxes. We drop the low-income
SEO oversample in the PSID and restrict our sample to households with male heads aged
20 to 65 with positive post-government income.
For each of three education groups (less than high school, high school, and college),
we estimate separate ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of the natural logarithm of income on a full
set of age dummies, a variable for family size, and a control for marital status.15 As is
standard (see, e.g., Cocco et al. (2005)), we estimate the income proﬁles for each education
group by ﬁtting third-order polynomials through the estimated age-dummy coeﬃcients and
use the ﬁxed-eﬀects residuals to estimate the transitory and permanent components of the
error process following the procedure in Carroll and Samwick (1997). The results, reported
in Table 2, indicate that income follows a hump-shaped process, with college graduates
showing the steepest income gradients.
4.2 Retirement Income
In retirement, we assume that Social Security beneﬁts replace 41 percent of income for high
school graduates and 34 percent of income for college graduates, in line with the estimates
for medium and high earners reported in Table VI.F10 of The 2008 Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Funds.16 Although our model assumes that individuals receive a constant
stream of real income in retirement, we recognize that this understates the risks facing older
households due to inﬂation (most DB plans are not cost-of-living adjusted), out-of-pocket
medical cost (see, e.g., Palumbo (1999), De Nardi et al. (2006), French (2005), and Love
et al. (2008)), ﬁnancial risk, and family shocks due to the unexpected death of a spouse.
We ignore many of these potentially interesting sources of resource uncertainty because our
current focus is on the tradeoﬀs between DB and DC plans during the working portion of
life. In addition, because we assume that DC contributions are immediately converted into
15Because the income proﬁles and simulated life histories of high school graduates and high school dropouts
look quite similar, we focus our results on high school and college graduates.
16A PDF version of the report can be found at: http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR08/tr08.pdf.
10a retirement annuity, we have eﬀectively assumed away one of key diﬀerences between DB
and DC accounts—the tradeoﬀ between the insurance provided by a a DB annuity and the
ability to drawdown a large portion of savings to ﬁnance a sudden medical expense shock.17
4.3 Preferences

















where b is a parameter determining the curvature of the marginal bequest function. For
the baseline results reported in the paper, we assume a value of ρ = 3 for the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion and set the bequest parameter to 0.
4.4 Transition Probabilities
In addition to income and preferences, we also need to choose values for the transition matrix
governing movements between employment states—i.e., the probabilities of job separations
and pension freezes. Further, since one of the focuses of this paper is on the transition from
a low-freeze-probability environment to a high-freeze-probability environment, we specify a
separate set of transition probabilities for each environment. The Markov chain we specify
for the transition probabilities is meant to be only a rough approximation of the employment
risks faced by a typical employee. While it does not allow separation probabilities to depend
on important characteristics such as age, job tenure, gender, or education, it does capture
the key features of our modeling framework. In each period, individuals in a DB ﬁrm face
two risks: they may experience a pension freeze (with a replacement DC plan) or they may
experience a transition to a “bad” job that oﬀers no pension at all.18 We assume that
17To test the importance of medical expense risk, we also solve the model allowing for both permanent
and transitory ﬂuctuations in retirement income due to out-of-pocket medical expenses. We estimated the
variance process for retirement income net of medical costs using data on income and medical costs from the
1992–2006 waves of the HRS (see Appendix for details). The most salient change induced by the presence
of income risk in retirement is a pronounced increased in the average level of cash on hand heading into
retirement and a markedly more gradual rate of wealth drawdown that reﬂects a strengthened precautionary
saving motive. Since we can obtain the same level of wealth accumulation by adjusting other parameters in
the model such as risk aversion and the discount factor, we decided to keep our results focused on the more
transparent (from a modeling perspective) case of constant retirement income.
18This possibility, which involves a drop in compensation, is included to capture the idea that some workers
may have ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital at stake in the event of job loss.
11workers in jobs with DC plans will never experience a pension “thaw”—a transition from a
DC plan to an unfrozen DB plan—but that they still face a probability of job separation.19











where i,j ∈ {DC plan, DB plan, No plan}. That is, a worker in a DB ﬁrm (second row)
faces a 1% freeze probability (ﬁrst column) and a 3% job loss probability (third column).











Thus, in this environment, workers in DB ﬁrms face a freeze probability of 5%. The low-
freeze (1%) and high-freeze (5%) probabilities are roughly consistent with the pre-2001 and
post-2001 incidences of DB freezes documented in Government Accountability Oﬃce (2008).
4.5 Pension Generosity
Empirically, most DB freezes are accompanied by enhancements to DC plans—typically
more generous matching provisions. We assume that ﬁrms oﬀering DC pensions match
contributions up to 6 percent of salary. In our baseline simulation, we assume that DC ﬁrms
oﬀer the modal match in the data of 50 percent (Munnell and Sunden, 2004). To capture
the idea of enhanced DC generosity in the event of a pension freeze, we also calibrate a
match that fully compensates workers in the aggregate—i.e., we choose the match rate that
causes the ﬁrm to incur the same expected annual pension costs as the prior DB plan.20 To
implement this, we assume a uniform age distribution of workers (normalized to one worker
per age), and specify the annual pension costs under a DC plan in which workers contribute





The annual costs under the DB plan are slightly more complicated. Let Qt be the annuity
price for an individual aged t, and let dt be her tenure. The expected annual costs of the
19This is consistent with empirical evidence—e.g., see Government Accountability Oﬃce (2008).
20Note that this does not ensure that each worker is fully compensated. We will return to this crucial
distinction below.
12DB plan are then given by:
α(1 + π)20−65P20Q20 + αE20
64 X
t=21
(1 + π)t−65[dtPtQt − dt−1Pt−1Qt−1/(1 + π)]. (13)
An easy way to interpret the annual DB costs in the equation above is to note that the ﬁrst
term is the cost of funding the accrued pension of a 20-year-old worker. The second term
inside the summation then represents the incremental increase in pension costs for older
workers, consisting of a tenure component (the dt terms) and an income component.21 As
a baseline assumption, we set the DB beneﬁt fraction α = 0.015, which is the most popular
generosity factor per year of service in the National Beneﬁts Survey (see Schrager (2006)).
We solve for the match rate µ that equates the annual pension costs in equations (12) and
(13).22
5 Simulation results
With our approximated decision rules in hand, we simulate 20,000 independent life histories
that vary by income realizations and employment. We initialize our model economy by
assuming that 50% of workers start out in a non-pension ﬁrm, 25% start out in a ﬁrm
oﬀering a DC pension, and 25% start out in a ﬁrm oﬀering a DB pension. All individuals
begin the working life with the same trend income but experience diﬀerent realizations of
shocks to transitory and permanent income.
The simulations allow us to describe the optimal saving decisions and welfare implica-
tions for the “typical” household in terms of savings, employment, and pension beneﬁts. We
begin our analysis of the simulation results by taking a brief look at the average life cycle
paths implied by our model parameterization. For the baseline speciﬁcation (DC matching
rate of 50% up to 6% of salary and a DB generosity factor of 1.5%), Figure 1 displays
the average simulated proﬁles of consumption, cash on hand, income, and the retirement
annuity for both high school and college graduates.
21Our estimated income proﬁles give us the expected values of permanent income, E20Pt. Obtaining
the expected values of dt requires slightly more work. Here we use 20,000 Monte Carlo simulations of our
employment transition matrix to ﬁnd the average tenures at each age t. As in our model simulations, we
initialize the process assuming that 25 percent of the population have a DB plan, 25 percent have a DC
plan, and 50 percent are employed in a ﬁrm that does not oﬀer a pension.
22Note that taxes do not enter the annual cost calculations. Since both employer contributions to DC and
DB plans receive the same tax advantage under the tax code, we can cancel the tax terms in each equation.
135.1 Cash on Hand
The trajectory of cash on hand follows the conventional accumulation pattern, hewing
closely to income during the early working years when households are likely to be credit
constrained and then rising rapidly to a peak at retirement. College graduates, who have
steeper and more hump-shaped income proﬁles, appear to be credit constrained for much
longer than high school graduates—a result that has been been found in previous life-cycle
studies (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989) and Hubbard et al. (1995)).23
5.2 Retirement Wealth
Another interesting feature is the relationship between income and the retirement annuity.
At the beginning of the working years, the average level of the retirement annuity barely
rises above zero, reﬂecting both the low levels of employee DC contributions at these ages
(despite the generous matching provisions, the credit constraints cause younger households
to defer making contributions until income rises above a threshold amount) as well as
the structure of the DB formula, which implies a nonlinear growth in pension beneﬁts with
respect to years of service. Although the retirement annuity accumulates during the working
years, it does not generate income until retirement. Thus, the average income proﬁles from
age 20 to 64 are essentially the same as the estimated income proﬁles from the PSID. At
retirement, however, permanent income includes both the retirement annuity as well as
the Social Security replacement rate. On net, the average simulations show that the total
replacement rate of income in retirement is close to 100%.24
5.3 Eﬀect of Pension Freezes
A key question about the transition from DB to DC plans is how the welfare consequences
of the transition are borne by employees of diﬀerent ages. In a classical labor market
with neither ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital nor search frictions, total compensation (wages
plus beneﬁts) must deliver the same reservation utility value, regardless of the structure of
23The simulated levels of cash on hand for the two education groups are lower than the wealth holdings in
the PSID. According to the 1999–2005 wealth supplements in the PSID, median cash on hand (deﬁned as net
wealth plus current income) for married high school graduates is around $300,000 for married couples and
around $200,000 for single males (in 2006 CPI-U-adjusted dollars). For college graduates, the median level
of cash on hand is around $550,000 for married couples and $300,000 for single males. The simulations in
Figure 1 show roughly half as much cash on hand. It is not surprising, however, that our model understates
wealth accumulation since we assume that all DC savings are annuitized.
24This might seem to be an optimistic view of retirement savings relative to what we observe in the data.
Munnell and Soto (2005), for instance, estimate median replacement rates in the HRS of about 79 percent
for married couples and about 89 percent for single-headed households. Once we account for the fact that
we are annuitizing 100% of DC contributions, however, the higher replacement rates seem less out of line
with their empirical counterparts.
14compensation. In that world, pension freezes and terminations would be wholly irrelevant
except to the extent that they signaled a change in the market clearing level of compensation.
In our model, we are implicitly assuming that some combination of search frictions and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital provides ﬁrms with the ability to change total compensation without
losing workers.
Higher probabilities of pension freezes may be viewed as good or bad news from the
standpoint of the representative employees in our model. Younger workers, for instance,
have more to gain from a shift from a DB to DC plan than older workers. Not only do they
have more years to contribute to the plan, but their lower average years of service mean
that they have less at stake in terms of foregone DB beneﬁts. Thus, we analyze the welfare
consequences of a pension freeze by age.
We target our simulation exercises to answer two basic questions about the transi-
tion from DB to DC plans. First, for diﬀerent ages and tenures, what are the welfare
consequences of a realized pension freeze—that is, what would be the required additional
compensation to make an employee indiﬀerent toward a DB pension freeze? And second,
what are the welfare consequences of an increase in the risk of a pension freeze, even among
those who do not experience one?
5.4 Welfare measure




DB (xt,at,dt) be the interpolated value functions for individuals in a ﬁrm with a DB
pension under either a low freeze probability or a high freeze probability environment. We
can solve for the change in cash on hand (normalized by permanent income), ∆trans
t , such
that the individual is indiﬀerent between the two environments. That is:
ˆ vlow
DB(xt,at,dt) = ˆ v
high
DB (xt + ∆trans
t ,at,dt). (14)
Using a root-ﬁnder to solve for ∆trans
t for each simulated individual with a DB plan, we
can then compute the average welfare compensating variation, ¯ ∆trans
t , for each age during
the working portion of the life cycle. The interpretation of ¯ ∆trans
t is that it represents the
average amount of additional wealth individuals aged t would need to receive to compensate
them for a shift in the transition probabilities occurring.
We can apply a similar technique to compute the compensating variations for realized
pension freezes occurring in either a high or a low freeze-probability environment. For
example, the welfare measure for a freeze in a low probability environment, ∆low
t , would be
given implicitly by:
ˆ vlow
DB(xt,at,dt) = ˆ vlow
DC(xt + ∆low
t ,at). (15)
15We can again average over individuals with a DB plan for each age t and calculate the
average compensation ¯ ∆low
t . Following the same strategy, we can compute ¯ ∆
high
t for indi-
viduals in a high probability environment. Together, the values of ¯ ∆trans
t , ¯ ∆low
t , and ¯ ∆
high
t
tell us how the typical simulated DB participant would fare under either a change in the
economy-wide probability of freezes or, more directly, under an actual pension freeze that
replaces a DB plan with a DC plan.
5.5 Welfare Results
5.5.1 Welfare Costs of a Realized Pension Freeze
Figure 2 shows how the compensating variations for a realized pension freeze change with
the age of the employee. The left age proﬁle shows the welfare measure for high school
graduates, and the right age proﬁle shows the results for college graduates. Since the welfare
costs of a freeze depend on the expectations of such an event (i.e., the freeze probabilities),
we plot two diﬀerent proﬁles for each education group: one that represents the welfare costs
of a sudden freeze for each age under a low freeze probability environment (probability =
1%) and one that represents the welfare costs under a high freeze probability environment
(probability = 5%).
The age proﬁle for high school graduates indicates that the welfare costs of a freeze
follows a hump-shaped path over the working portion of the life cycle, with a peak at around
$6,000 for the low probability environment and around $5,000 for the high probability
environment. Intuitively, the more likely a freeze is, the less costly the realization of the
event. The hump-shaped pattern primarily reﬂects the accrual formula of the DB plan.
Early in the life cycle, average years of service are low, and less DB beneﬁts are at stake in
the event of a freeze. Later, as average tenures lengthen and incomes rise (both of which
generate increases in DB beneﬁts), the welfare costs of shifting to a DC plan become more
severe. After a certain point, around age 55, incomes taper oﬀ, leaving less DB beneﬁts on
the table in the event of a freeze. Welfare costs therefore tend to decline in the last 10 years
or so before retirement. Note that the welfare costs of a freeze are always positive for both
high school and college graduates. We generate this result with the baseline model because
a DC plan with a 50% match is strictly dominated by a DB plan with a 1.5% generosity
factor.
College graduates have a slightly diﬀerent pattern of welfare costs due to pension freezes.
Just as with high school graduates, average welfare costs reach a maximum near age 55,
but they do not rise monotonically throughout the working life. Instead, there is an initial
increase to about age 35, then a slight drop, and then an acceleration to the age-55 peak.
This occurs because early in the life cycle, when households are credit-constrained and the
16marginal utility of consumption is high, DB accruals are low relative to what optimal DC
saving would be. In other words, young households beneﬁt from the back-loaded nature of
DB plans in that they allow young workers to consume more when their marginal utility of
consumption is relatively high. Thus college graduates, who are severely credit-constrained
for the ﬁrst decade of the working life, ﬁnd freezes particularly costly since they force the
worker to switch to a DC plan and thus reduce consumption further in order to accumulate
suﬃcient retirement resources. After age 35 or so, college graduates are no longer credit
constrained, and the DC plan becomes an increasingly attractive vehicle for retirement
saving. For a while, these beneﬁts lead to a reduction in the welfare costs associated with
a freeze until, eventually, the service and income parts of the DB formula again make DCs
increasingly costly to the worker.
Note that even though college graduates have higher average earnings than high school
graduates, they show a lower average welfare cost—in absolute terms. The explanation for
this resides in the lower Social Security replacement rates experience by college graduates
relative to high-school graduates. College graduates save more because they expect a much
sharper decline in income in retirement and thus have a stronger incentive to build up wealth
either through both conventional saving and DC contributions. Thus, college graduates
who experience a freeze can add to their saving by substituting from conventional saving
to DC contributions. High school graduates, in contrast, may have to signiﬁcantly reduce
their consumption to take advantage of the more generous matching contributions after the
freeze.25
5.5.2 Welfare Costs of a Higher Freeze Probabilities
The rapid acceleration of pension freezes and terminations in the last 10 years raises the
question of how costly this transition in the freeze probabilities has been for the typical
employee with a DB plan. That is, even without experiencing a freeze directly, an employee
might still experience a signiﬁcant decrease in welfare because of the decrease in the expected
value of pension beneﬁts. Figure 3 examines the welfare consequences of a shift in the
probability of a freeze from 1%, which corresponds to the pre-2000s environment, to a
probability of 5%, which is in line with the probabilities implied by the spate of pension
freezes in the early 2000s. The shapes of the proﬁles for high school and college gradates
look quite similar to the proﬁles in Figure 2, with welfare costs between a ﬁfth and a quarter
as large.
As a ﬁnal set of welfare experiments, we also investigate the implications of pension
25The issue of asset substitution is central to the debate on whether 401(k) plans actually create new
national saving. For a discussion of the importance of asset substitution in DC plans, see Engen et al.
(1996).
17freezes and an economy-wide transition in the probability of pension freezes for the case
in which ﬁrms replace DB plans with a DC plan that costs the same expected amount
annually. Figure 4 displays the simulated proﬁles of welfare costs of pension freezes for high
school and college graduates. In contrast to the previous experiment with a DC matching
rate of 50%, the higher implied matching rate in these versions of the model, make the DC
plan the preferred savings vehicle for younger high school graduates and for almost all ages
for college graduates. The pattern, though is similar. The DC plan is most attractive at
the point where households would like to build up wealth for retirement and relatively less
at older ages, when the DB formula implies large gains due to tenure and wage growth.
Younger college graduates gain as much as $12,000 in compensating variation terms from
pension freezes with the higher matching rate (over 100%), while high school graduates show
a much smaller change. Again, the diﬀerence has to do with the diﬀerence in the saving
incentives implied by the age proﬁles of earnings and the Social Security replacement rates.
College graduates have a stronger incentive to save in order to supplement pension and
Social Security income and therefore beneﬁt disproportionately from the shift to the DC
plan.
6 Important Omissions Left for Future Work
This paper takes a preliminary look at the welfare consequences of the recent increase in DB
pension freezes and terminations. The welfare consequences are computed from simulations
of a life-cycle model that allows for employment transitions among ﬁrms oﬀering DB plans,
DC plans, or no pension plan at all. The baseline simulations indicate that the costs of
pension freezes are relatively modest when the DB pension is replaced by a DC plan with
a match rate of 50 percent or more. High school graduates, for instance, would require
an average of at most about $6,000 in additional cash on hand to compensate them for a
pension freeze. College graduates would require only about a third as much. In addition,
when we set the DC employer matching rate in such a way that the ﬁrm’s annual pension
costs remain roughly the same, we ﬁnd that younger high school graduates and college
graduates of all ages would actually beneﬁt from a pension freeze.
This work is preliminary. In trying to characterize the welfare consequences of pension
freezes and terminations, we have made a number of modeling decisions that could limit
the empirical validity of our simulations. Some of these compromises are unlikely to have
a large eﬀect on the basic message of our paper—namely that the welfare costs associated
with pension freezes are relatively small—but others are likely to have a ﬁrst-order impact
on our results. The two most important omissions, in our view, are the absence of a labor
supply decision and the violation of market-clearing compensation.
18Labor supply matters in a couple of respects. First, because the DB pension formula is
linked to years of service, employees who may have experienced shocks to income during the
working years have an incentive to stay with the ﬁrm to accumulate additional savings and
beneﬁts. Of course, ﬁrms are aware of this incentive and generally structure their beneﬁt
formulas to encourage normal-age retirement. But even still, labor supply constitutes an
essential margin of adjustment that can limit the welfare consequences of events such as
pension freezes and terminations.
In terms of the labor market, a more fundamental issue is that our modeling framework
violates a market-clearing condition. As Bulow (1982) has pointed out in the context of
measuring pension liabilities, salary and pension beneﬁts should be consistent with the
instantaneous marginal product of labor in each year of an employee’s service at the ﬁrm.
If the value of compensation were to fall below the market clearing condition, the employee
would leave for another ﬁrm. If the value of compensation were too high, the ﬁrm would
be overpaying relative to the market and thus run negative proﬁts. In our model, this
competitive labor market condition would imply that employees would face, in expectation,
zero change in the utility value of compensation when a ﬁrm freezes its pension.
In contrast to the competitive labor market condition, Ippolito (1985a,b) has argued that
DB pension represent an implicit contract between the ﬁrm and the employee, with ﬁrms
underpaying relative to the marginal product in early years and overpaying relative to the
marginal product in later years. This assumption would allow for an eﬀect from a pension
freeze in our model; however, it raises the question why the ﬁrm would suddenly decide to
restructure the age pattern of compensation by freezing its pension. Might it reﬂect an age
bias (presumably toward the young) in the distribution of skill-based technical change? If so,
then the real story is less about pension freezes and more about the nature of this change in
the age composition of productivity shocks. Alternatively, the age tilt in the compensation
pattern of DBs may reﬂect a bargaining agreement between unions and managers. But if
this is the case, then the locus of the issue is again not so much the pension freeze per se,
but instead the weakening of union bargaining power at the expense of older workers.
Finally, because pension freezes are a relatively recent phenomenon, it is diﬃcult to
know whether we are right in modeling the transition as movement from one low-probability
steady state to another, higher-probability steady state. If the freezes are actually symptoms
of the broader decline and possible extinction of DB plans, then the expected probabilities
may indeed by increasing over time.
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21Table 1
Hard Frozen DB Plans
2003 2004 2005
Percent of Plans 9.5 12.1 14.1
Percent of Participants 2.5 3.5 6.1
Percent of Liabilities 1.4 1.9 4.1












Replacement rate SS 0.4100 0.3400
Coeﬃcient estimates
Children in HH 0.0387 0.0327
(0.0029) (0.0049)
Adults in HH 0.2275 0.1894
(0.0043) (0.0072)















This table presents the ﬁtted age polynomials, coeﬃ-
cient estimates, and variance decomposition from sep-
arate ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions for high school and college
graduates of the natural logarithm of income on a full
set of age dummies and the number of children living in
the household. The data are taken from the 1980–2003
waves of the PSID. Income is a “post-government” con-
cept that sums household labor income, public transfers,
and private transfers and subtracts income and payroll
taxes. We restrict the sample to respondents aged 20–65
with no additional adults apart from a spouse living in
the household, and we exclude observations with incomes
less than $3,000 or greater than $3,000,000. The estima-
tion procedure for the error structure follows Carroll and
Samwick (1997).








































































Simulated consumption, cash on hand, permanent income, and retirement annuity: The ﬁgure
shows the average simulated levels of consumption Ct, cash on hand Xt, permanent income Pt, and the
retirement annuity At for high school graduates (left panel) and college graduates (right panel). The averages
are taken over 20,000 independent life histories of income and employment shocks. The baseline model is
solved for a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 3, a bequest parameter b = 0, a pre-tax interest rate of
r = 5.5%, a discount factor β = 1/(1+r), a DB beneﬁt generosity factor α = 1.5%, and a DC plan employer
matching rate of 50% up to 6% of income. Note that in retirement, permanent income includes the value of
the retirement annuity.



































































Simulated welfare costs of a pension freeze: The ﬁgure shows the average simulated welfare costs (the
compensating equivalent values, in thousands) of experiencing a pension freeze at diﬀerent ages during the
working life. The left panel shows the welfare costs for high school graduates, and the right panel shows
the welfare costs for college graduates. The “low freeze prob” lines represent the average welfare costs of
pension freezes in an economy with a freeze probability of 1%. The “high freeze prob” lines represent the
average welfare costs of freezes in an economy with a freeze probability of 5%. The averages are taken over
individuals of each age, conditional on being employed by a ﬁrm oﬀering a DB pension. The baseline model
is solved for a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 3, a bequest parameter b = 0, a pre-tax interest
rate of r = 5.5%, a discount factor β = 1/(1 + r), a DB beneﬁt generosity factor α = 1.5%, and a DC plan
employer matching rate of 50% up to 6% of income.

































































Simulated welfare costs of an increase in the probability of a pension freeze: The ﬁgure shows
the average simulated welfare costs (the compensating equivalent values, in thousands) of a sudden increase
in the probability of pension freezes (from a 1% risk to a 5% risk) for diﬀerent ages during the working life.
The left panel shows the welfare costs for high school graduates, and the right panel shows the welfare costs
for college graduates. The averages are taken over individuals of each age, conditional on being employed
by a ﬁrm oﬀering a DB pension. The baseline model is solved for a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of
ρ = 3, a bequest parameter b = 0, a pre-tax interest rate of r = 5.5%, a discount factor β = 1/(1+r), a DB
beneﬁt generosity factor α = 1.5%, and a DC plan employer matching rate of 50% up to 6% of income.






































































Simulated welfare costs of a pension freeze (with match set to equalize pension costs): The
ﬁgure shows the average simulated welfare costs (the compensating equivalent values, in thousands) of
experiencing a pension freeze at diﬀerent ages during the working life. The left panel shows the welfare costs
for high school graduates, and the right panel shows the welfare costs for college graduates. The “low freeze
prob” lines represent the average welfare costs of pension freezes in an economy with a freeze probability of
1%. The “high freeze prob” lines represent the average welfare costs of freezes in an economy with a freeze
probability of 5%. The averages are taken over individuals of each age, conditional on being employed by a
ﬁrm oﬀering a DB pension. The baseline model is solved for a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 3, a
bequest parameter b = 0, a pre-tax interest rate of r = 5.5%, a discount factor β = 1/(1 + r), a DB beneﬁt
generosity factor α = 1.5%, and a DC plan employer matching rate of 112% for high school graduates and
136% for college graduates up to 6% of income.































































Simulated welfare costs of an increase in the probability of a pension freeze (with match set
to equalize pension costs): The ﬁgure shows the average simulated welfare costs (the compensating
equivalent values, in thousands) of a sudden increase in the probability of pension freezes (from a 1% risk to
a 5% risk) for diﬀerent ages during the working life. The left panel shows the welfare costs for high school
graduates, and the right panel shows the welfare costs for college graduates. The averages are taken over
individuals of each age, conditional on being employed by a ﬁrm oﬀering a DB pension. The baseline model
is solved for a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 3, a bequest parameter b = 0, a pre-tax interest
rate of r = 5.5%, a discount factor β = 1/(1 + r), a DB beneﬁt generosity factor α = 1.5%, and a DC
plan employer matching rate of 112% for high school graduates and 136% for college graduates up to 6% of
income.
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